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The -influenza pandemic of 1918 caused the 
deaths of some 20 million people throughout the 
world and was probably the worst epidemic in 
human history. With the exceptions of New 
Guinea, St. Helena and certain South Pacific 
Islands, the Whole world was ultimately ravaged 
by the disease which attacked 50 -per cent, of 
the world’s population, the attendant -death-rate 
averaging 3 -per -cent. This paper will briefly 
describe the passage of the epidemic through 
Southern Rhodesia, with particular regard to the 
mining industry. -It will examine the Admini­
stration’s response to the advent of the disease 
and the subsequent criticisms voiced by the 
Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, before discussing 
the -African labour conditions on the mines -in 
relation to the influenza epidemic and the treat­
ments used to combat its spread. The conclusion 
will attempt to assess -the effects of the epidemic 
on the mining industry of Southern Rhodesia.1
The first cases of epidemic influenza in Southern 
Rhodesia. occurred amongst the railway staff 
in Bulawayo about the 9th October, 1918, the 
disease having appeared in epidemic form in 
South Africa in the middle of the previous 
month. -Bulawayo itself -was rapidly infected 
and -from there the epidemic spread equally 
swiftly to- Que Que, U-mvuma and Salisbury, 
before engulfing " the remaining towns and -districts 
along 'the railway lines. The spread of infeotion 
was apparently governed by “the density of the 
population in. any particular centre and the mode 
of communication with other -infected places”. 
But although on October 12-th, rail travel by 
Africans was forbidden in an attempt to' delay 
the spread of the epidemic — a prohibition soon 
extended to the Coloureds and Indians and which
remained -in force for almost a month — In­
fluenza was carried to many parts of the rural 
areas by the thousands of deserters -from -the 
mines. Some of -the-more isolated districts, su-ch 
as Inyanga and Melsetter, and a few of the small, 
remote mines, initially escaped infection, only 
•to socou-mfo the -following year.2 The epidemic 
brought -the normal • administrative, economic and 
social activities of- 'Che territory to a virtual halt, 
and forced the closure of all the large mines, 
and most of -the smaller propositions. -By the 
22nd October the situation at Que Que was 
described as serious, with 150 fatalities and some 
“ . . . dead [having] been found Who could never 
have had any medical aid.” At the Falcon Mine 
the majority of the African labour force was' 
either ill or -had' deserted, a significant number 
of the latter having died in -Che veldt; of the 
“161 white mine employees, only 30 are [well 
enough for] working, feeding and attending 
natives.” These conditions were duplicated on a-l'l 
the large' mines -in the country;' for example, at 
Wankie: “In the-space of a few days nearly 2 000 
natives were prostrated. The resources of the 
Colliery -management were taxed to the uttermost 
in giving relief, as a large number of -the-Euro­
peans also contracted the epidemic.” However* 
by the end of October the worst of the epidemic 
had passed and Wankie and a few other mines 
had already resumed work, -but oh a considerably 
reduced scale. On 9th November, all travel 
restrictions were -lifted and five' -days. later the 
Acting Administrator, Newton Was able to -inform 
the London Board of the B.S.A. Company that, 
with -the' exception of Urntali, the epidemic was 
practically over in the main towns and the 
position in the country districts was much im­
proved.3 Although recurrent waves of the -in­
fluenza epidemic affected certain rural areas and 
mines -in following years, their im-pacf was 
comparatively minor and consequently will form 
no part of this discussion.
Apparently the potential severity of the epi­
demic was initially not appreciated by -the Ad­
ministration, particularly as the mortality rate in 
South Africa was at first low. Little advance 
preparation was made for -the epidemic and it 
was riot until -the first influenza cases had ap-
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peared in Southern Rhodesia that orders for 
vaccine were sent to 'the Cape laboratory that 
normally supplied the territory’s needs. Because 
of the demand for vaccine within South Africa 
itself, the supplies requested by Southern Rhodesia 
were only made available after a fortnight’s delay, 
by which time the influenza epidemic was es­
tablished across the country. As Fleming later 
remarked, “We were therefore handicapped by 
being in the position of 'inoculating at the heels 
of an epidemic rather than in front of it.” 
Furthermore, the swiftness and severity of the 
epidemic in its early stages virtually overwhelmed 
the Administration’s medical service, which in 
any event was handicapped by a shortage of trained 
men and nurses because of their absence on 
active service in various theatres of the war. For 
example, vacancies for medical men existed at 
Aroturus, Belingwe, Rusape and Enkeldoorn- 
Umvuma, and this shortage had necessitated the 
olosure of the African hospital at Ndanga. As 
doctors and trained nurses were often themselves 
among the first victims of the disease, the Ad­
ministration initially concentrated its depleted 
forces against the epidemic in the towns,' and 
left the rural districts, including the mines and 
the African reserves, largely to their own devices. 
The majority of the larger mines had their own 
hospitals and doctors, and here the Administration 
restricted 'itself to the supply of medicines and 
vacoines as they became available, but was unable 
to give any further aid. A telegram from the 
Falcon Mine asking for help as “Doctor arid 
riurse cannot stand strain much longer” received 
the following reply, which graphically illustrates 
the dislocation caused by the influenza epidemic: 
“Quite impossible [to] send relief at present 
moment as supply of medical men and nurses 
required all over the country quite inadequate for 
the demands Bulawayo and Salisbury hopelessly 
understaffed and position is same pretty well 
elsewhere . . . ” Once they were in position to 
do so, the Native Commissioners and Compound 
Inspectors sought to bring aid to isolated srriall 
mines and the African reserves, where in many
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instances invaluable work was also performed by 
missionaries and by black and white lay volun­
teers.
The Administration subsequently came under 
heavy fire from the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, 
and 'had that body restricted itself to criticising 
the tardy response evinced by the Administration 
and Fleming’s overly-complacent assertion that 
the scattered nature of the mines would militate 
against a severe epidemic, it would have remained 
on stronger and more justifiable grounds. How­
ever, the Chamber failed to appreciate that, given 
the state of medical knowledge of the time, there 
was in fact little the Administration could have 
done to prevent the spread of the epidemic. 
Similarly, officials in both the Medical and Native 
Departments often fell early prey to the disease, 
and until their recovery in sufficient numbers, 
organised relief was nearly impossible. The 
Chamber’s case was presented in the form of a 
collection of emotional and often anonymous 
complaints culled from various individuals around 
the oountry and from letters to the press. While 
cases of hardship undoubtedly existed and the 
Administration’s initial complacency deserved 
censure, the Ohamber was premature in its 
criticisms, especially as it,ref used to wait for the 
publication of the reports’ of the various depart­
ments concerned. As regards this criticism 
Fleming thought that the “people were numbed 
and staggered with the immensity of the 
disaster, and it was only natural that at a 
■time such as this, feelings Should run high.” 
Chaplin suggested that “considering the circum­
stances and the difficulties of the time and the 
want of knowledge, there is no great cause for 
thinking the departments concerned did not do 
all they could.” This seems to have been realised 
by the High Commissioner because, although the 
criticisms made by the Rhodesia Ohamber of 
Mines were forwarded to him, no action was 
taken.4
Generally speaking, African labour con­
ditions on the mines in this period were gradually 
improving, but housing was often inadequate and
THE 1918 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC IN RHOD.
Table I
Mortality R ate all causes African and E uropean M in e  E mployees
Year
AFRICANS EUROPEANS
Average No. 
employed
D.R. all causes 
p.m. p.a.
Average No. 
employed
D.R. all causes 
p.m. p.a.
1917 38861 . 17,39 1625 2,46
1918 32766 107,72 1452 39,26
Source: A3/12/17.
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overcrowded, partly because of the expansion in 
the numbers Of 'the labour force between 1913- 
1916. Sanitary arrangements, often of the open 
trench type barely sufficed under normal con­
ditions, and were potential health hazards in 
extraordinary circumstances, as in 1918.
Table II
African Mortality Rate on
Groups of M ines  of D ifferent Size
Average No. No. of deaths from disease
Death' rate 
per mille per 
annum 
employed
Group 1: mines 
employing over 
1 000 Africans
11 388 1 395 122,50
Group 2: mines 
employing over 
500 & under 
1 000 Africans
1 603 239 149,10
Group 3: mines 
employing over 
. 300 & under 
500 Africans
3 572 473 132,42
Group 4: mines 
employing 
under 300 
Africans
16 203 1 522 93,93
Source: Report on the Public Health for the 
year 1918.
Discrepancies between the two tables con­
cerning the total death rate are explained by 
the figures in Table I being early, uncorrected 
returns.
The two tables show the African death ralte 
by all causes and not that of the epidemic alone, 
but the tremendous increase in the death rate is 
due to epidemic Influenza and a related increase 
in’the number of deaths from pneumonia. Refer­
ence to Table II shows that the total number of 
African deaths in 1918 on all mines was 3,629, 
while the total number of African miners, as 
shown in Table I, was 32,766. If no non-random 
factors were at work then the expected number 
of deaths within each group would be proportion­
al to the total number of miners within that 
group. Table III sets out the observed and “ex­
pected” numbers of deaths within' each group.
Table 111 
Deaths
GROUP OBSERVED EXPECTED
Group 1: Mines employing 
over 1 000 Africans
' 1 395 1 261
Group 2: mines employing 
over 500 and under 1 000 
Africans
239 177
Group 3: mines employing 
over 300 and under 500 
Africans
473 396
Group 4: mines employing 
under 300 Africans
1 522 1 795
T otal 3 629 3 629
In order to determine whether the number of 
deaths within each group, i.e. the “observed” 
deaths, were likely to have occurred purely by 
chance a ^2 test was applied.5 The calculated 
value of x2 is 92,4 (on 3 degrees of freedom). The 
0,0005 significance limit (17,73) is well below 
the calculated value, 92,4 and it is therefore 
concluded that the number of deaths within each 
group could not have occurred due to random 
factors alone. In’ other words, there is a greater 
than 99,95 per cent, certainty that non-random 
factors were at work. A broad interpretation of 
Table II would suggest that, as the death rate 
rises from Group 4 through to Group 2, before 
dropping considerably - in the last category, the 
greater the concentration of mine workers the 
higher was the death rate from influenza, given 
the crowded housing conditions on many of the 
mines, in Groups 1 to 3. The fall in the last 
category is perhaps explained by the existence 
of hospitals and trained personnel on the mines 
concerned; in Group 2, mines of that size often 
provided hospital accommodation but had no 
resident doctor and relied on visits by the district 
surgeon. Similarly a mine was not obliged by law 
to employ a full-time compound manager unless 
the number of Africans employed exceeded 300, 
and no full-time assistant was required until 750 
or more Africans were engaged. This point is 
worth noting, as in many instances the brunt 
of caring for the sick during the epidemic fell on 
the compound managers, who might find them­
selves caring almost single-handedly for up to 
750 labourers, a factor which may have tended to 
increase the death rate. Out of the total African
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labour force on the m ines,'19 471 workers were 
infected by the epidemic and of this number 
2 851 were reported as having died. Fleming ob­
served that “Native miners suffered more severe­
ly than any other class of the population.” As 
mentioned previously, however, this varied with 
the number employed arid their distances - from 
infected centres. A further reason has been sug­
gested by Gelfand, who pointed to the generally 
poorer physique and diet of-Africans as -contri­
buting to their high mortality rate in the epi­
demic.
Table IV
Comparative Death R ates, I nfluenza only, 
between M in in g  Compounds 
and R ural V illages
District Death rate in villages
Death rate in , 
mining 
compounds
Matobo ' 1% ' 8-9%
Bulalima . 3% No mines
Umzingwane 3,4% .15%
Bubi 2% ■ 6%
Nyamandhlovu 3,25% No mines
Sclukvvc ' 2,5%
1 1 • 
o £
Belingwe 3,69% 
. " - 10%  ■
Source: N9/1/21.
Unfortunately Table' IV is the only detailed 
breakdown of' the death rate by districts, but 
the pattern revealed there seems to hold good 
for the country' as a whole, where the mortality 
rate per cent, on the mines caused by the epidemic 
averaged 9,174; while in the Reserves it was esti­
mated at only 2-3 per cent. According to the 
Native Commisioner for the Bulawayo District, 
“It thus happened that the natives lin the town 
and at miries' who were' in a position — through 
being concentrated — to receive some measure of 
treatment suffered far more severely and ex­
perienced a far higher death rate than the kraal 
natives, the bulk of 'Whom weathered the storm 
with little or no outside assistance.” He hastened 
to add that this “was almost certainly not due to 
the superiority of native herbs and remedies over
those applied to European patients but rather . . . 
to the absence of the concentration which organi­
sation implied.” Africans who lived on farms and 
in the Reserves appear to have escaped compara­
tively lightly, the death rate rising steeply in the 
large towns and particularly on most of the 
mines.
An explanation for the almost “explosive” 
nature of the epidemic on many mines and the 
pneumonic complications often induced by the 
Influenza is suggested by Stuart-Harris: “Symp­
toms may then arise as a result of multiplication 
oif virus -if some environmental change such as 
sudden Chilling disturbs the natural resistance ol 
the respiratory tract as in the case of swine 'in 
fluenza. This would explain the instances o. 
apparent simultaneous involvement of all mem­
bers of a family. Also during explosive outbreaks 
in schools or other communities, it is difficult to 
account for the extremely rapid build-up of in­
fection except by some sort of mechanism as 
that outlined.” Underground workers were par­
ticularly susceptible to temperature changes, and, 
indeed, one Native Commissioner noted that 
they suffered proportionately more from the epi­
demic than did workers in other job categories. 
Because of the often',over-crowded housing and 
potentially hazardous sanitation arrangements, to­
gether with the temperature Changes experienced 
by underground workers — who, once under­
ground, .tended to work in hot, confined areas — it 
seems obvious that the .mines, especially the larger 
and deeper ones, as concentrated centres of popu­
lation often provided optimum conditions for the 
rapid spread of the Influenza epidemic. In this 
connection it is significant that the Medical 
Director’s Report on the Public Health for 1919 
ascribed the comparatively less severe mortality 
rate of the recurrent epidemic waves in part to 
the less crowded housing conditions on the mines 
in that year, this being partly due to the ravages 
of 1918/'
The Influenza pandemic of 1918 was character­
ised by the occurrence of “high death rates in 
young adults, by secondary infection by 
Haemophilus influenza in the second and third 
waves which probably played a large part in the 
increased mortality and by the occurrence in 
many of the more severe oases of an intensive 
cyanosis.” Although the exact nature of the virus 
associated with the 1918 pandemic is still a sub­
ject of controversy, the most likely suggestion is 
that it was a strain of virus A, “related to . or 
identical with the swine virus isolated by Shope 
in 1931.” In 1918, however, medical science knew 
little concerning the nature of epidemic In­
fluenza, and when answering the criticisms made 
by the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, Fleming felt
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obliged to quote Sir Arthur Newsholme, the then 
Medical Advisor to the Local Government Board 
in England, to the effect that he knew “of ho 
public health measures -which can arrest the 
progress Of pandemic influenza.” Although 
Fleming thought “the virus of Influenza (was) 
undoubtedly due to a living organism”, he ob­
served that its nature was still Obscure, but advo­
cated preventative inoculation because “though 
possibly not conferring immunity from infection 
to any degree, (it) yet affects the onset of danger­
ous complications and materially lowers the mor­
tality rate.” In a more cautious report, the 
Medical Director admitted that this advocacy was 
no more than a belief, as no valid statistical evi­
dence existed to support the assumption that the 
various vaccines used— the most common being 
a “mixed vaccine containing ‘Pfeiffer’s Bacillus’ 
with the organisms of pneumonia and septicaemia” 
— materially reduced the mortality rate, except 
possibly as regards cases of pneumonia induced 
by the Influenza. Fleming at least was aware 
of the limitations of the vaccines used, unlike 
some members of the Rhodesia Chamber of 
Mines, who had ordered supplies from a private 
laboratory in lohannesburg, but as the Medical 
Director pointed out, it was a curative vaccine 
and useless for the purpose required.7
Present-day medical 'knowledge would suggest 
that the value of the vaccines then used was 
doubtful, although some people believe that they 
may have been Of some psychological importance, 
as sheer nervous fright may have increased the 
mortality in neglected cases. Even had the vac­
cines been of any significant value, the initial delay 
in obtaining them meant that the comparatively 
useless practice of curative as opposed to pre­
ventative vaccination was followed. A further 
obstacle to effective treatment was the concen­
tration of labour on the mines, group infection 
often causing the entire work force, both African 
and -European, to fall ill at much the same time, 
which rendered adequate medical assistance al­
most impossible and so tended to raise the death 
rate. Although „ desertions from the mines un­
doubtedly aided the spread of the epidemic, and 
many deserters died untended in the bush, one 
Native Commissioner was of the opinion that 
desertion had brought positive benefits. At 
Shafoani the 900 indigenous African mine em­
ployees all deserted and only 75 of them subse­
quently died from the epidemic; While at the 
neighbouring Birthday Mine the labour force 
mostly remained on the mine, but 103 lives out 
of 500 employed were lost. “Though against ad­
vice, desertion has proved to have been a wise 
course. The carrying of the disease to their 
homes may have hastened its spread hut there is
no doubt, had they remained in the compounds, 
the mortality would have been far greater.” 
Dispersal of the mines’ labour force or its reverse, 
total quarantine of the various mines, would cer­
tainly have lowered the mortality rate, but were 
not considered practicable measures, although 
one small mine, the Germania, did practise a 
total quarantine successfully and escaped the 
epidemic.
In the eariy stages of the epidemic and in the 
more remote districts employees and others giving 
aid often had to improvise various forms of re­
lief. Quinine and Epsom Salts were used widely, 
as were axle-grease poultices, and all were various­
ly reported as having afforded some comfort. 
One mineowner was reported as having discovered 
a mixture of paraffin and sugar to he a successful 
cure as is still believed by some employers who 
maintain that in some instances paraffin operates 
as a crude heart stimulant. Similarly, at the 
Mali Mine, the tributor “doctored (the Africans) 
with a mixture of paraffin and eucalyptus and 
gave Friars Balsam and dop to those bleeding 
at the lungs, with success.” In many cases the 
provision of dedicated nursing and good food 
seems to have reduced the mortality rate, and the 
various sources consulted constantly mention the 
unstinted aid given the sick by many mining em­
ployers and members of .the community as a 
whole. The only exceptions, as far as mining 
was concerned, were a few mine managers on 
the smaller mines who were “unnerved at the 
spread of the epidemic or the possibility of 
becoming victims and . . .  in consequence little 
if anything was . . . done to help the sufferers be­
yond sending a boss boy into the compound with 
some quinine, pneumonia mixture to be admini­
stered at his discretion.”
Once supplies of vaccination became widely 
available, those officials attempting to administer 
it encountered a certain amount of opposition 
caused both 'by the lack of success where it had 
been previously used arid by the suspicion felt 
by many Africans that Europeans were respon­
sible for the Influenza epidemic. A significant 
number of African mine employees believed the 
epidemic to have spread from the laboratory at 
the Falcon Mine where Lister was conducting 
experiments on a vaccine against pneumonia. The 
Native Commissioner for Belingwe reported that 
the sick in one village refused his assistance on the 
grounds that “If the medicine was any good, 
there should not have been so many deaths 
among the Europeans and natives at the Mines 
and Compounds.” Many African mineworkers in 
the Selukwe district, once they found they were 
not making a rapid recovery, refused any further 
European medical attention in favour of their
147
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own methods. “The most popular of treatments 
was cold water — Natives could be seen in large 
numlbers bathing in the streams adjoining the 
Compounds.” Cold water immersion while run­
ning a temperature would seem 'likely to have 
induced pneumonia, and, indeed the “Fingoes 
who were the first to invent ithe cold water cure 
died like fllies.” However, similar treatment noted 
on the Birthday Mine, where open-air camps were 
instituted following the early heavy mortality, was 
apparently successful.8
The immediate and Obvious impact of the 
Influenza epidemic on the Southern Rhodesian 
mining industry was the closure of most of the 
mines for periods ranging from two weeks to al­
most a month. Fleming thought the pandemic 
was the severest blow suffered by the mining in­
dustry up to that point, and the Secretary for 
• Mines later estimated that the resultant loss to 
the industry was approximately £400 000. The 
pandemic seriously disrupted the African labour 
supply on the mines and the subsequent labour 
shortage was still felt in early 1919, which tended 
to strengthen the bargaining position of African 
employees. One result of the pandemic was to 
ease briefly overcrowding on many of the mines, 
but it was very doubtful if this was a direct 
management initiative, as opposed to fewer men 
filling existing accommodation. From about 
1918 Che mining industry entered a difficult eco­
nomic period for some years and in this sense 
the Influenza pandemic occurred at an especially 
inopportune moment. However, its long-term 
effects were negligible when considered in this 
wider context of generally unfavourable economic 
conditions.9 The pandemic and its concomitant 
high death rate may have had some influence on 
the changing composition of the African labour 
force on the mines. This change, until 1920 
when some sort off equilibrium was reached, was 
associated with an increasing proportion of alien 
African workers within the total workforce. 
Southern Rhodesian Africans would have been 
able to observe the low deaths rates in the rural 
areas as apposed to the mines — and in fact 
many deserted — while alien Africans, further - 
from their homes, may have lacked the opportuni­
ties for intimate comparisons of this type. If this 
was so, it is suggested as no more than a minor 
effect of the pandemic, as economic considerations 
decisively affected both allien and indigenous 
Africans’ choice of work. As regards European 
labour on the mines, the pandemic may have 
accentuated a pre-existing shortage of skilled 
labour and so possibly strengthened organised 
white labour in its later demands on the various 
mine managements.
In brief the Influenza pandemic of 1918, al­
though a dramatic episode in the medical history
T h e  Central African 
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of Southern Rhodesia, does not appear to have 
had any significant long-term effects on the mining 
industry, apart from precipitating a structural 
ohange which would have occurred anyway. 
The pandemic did stimulate an awareness 
of the general need for wider-reaching Public 
Health legislation, but factors outside the scope 
of this paper obtruded to cause a delay in the 
introduction of the proposed bill.
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